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I.  I  ntroducti  on
The  effects of  changes  in monetary  policy on the level of  economic
activjty  are obviously  critical  to forming  appropriate  policy.  t,|ith the
recent  instability  exhibited  in the relationship  between  M1  and  nominal  GNP'
alternative  i  nd  i  cators/targets are being  considered. one approach  has been
to  look at  broader  monetary  aggregates,  such  as M2  and  M3.  An alternative
approach  is  to  consider  a more  narow measure  of  monetary  policy.  One  such
poljcy variable is  the monetary  base.U  The  Shadow  0pen  Market  Commjttee
has long reconmended  targeting the monetary  base.  Recently,  the House
Banking  and  Monetary  Policy Subcommittee  concured with thjs  sentinent
stating that  the Federal  Reserve  should  give "serious consjderation  to
reporting target ranges  for  the rnonetary  base."2/  The  President  of  the
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St.  Louis has  also recently proposed  a quasi-rule
for  monetary  base grovrth.3/
A slight  problem  exists despite the apparent  concreteness  in  these
declarations.  The  obstacle  to  irnplementing  such  a target  is  that
monetary  aggregates  l'11,  M2  and  M3--there  is  no single measure  used
monetary  base.  l,,lithin  the Federal  Reserve  System  itself  there
different  monetary  base  neasures: one  calculated by the Board
1
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Governors,the other calculated by the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  5t.  Louis.  It  is
inportant to  set forth  the differences between  these  measures,  to  the extent
they differ,  and  to determine  which  base  is  the more  desjrable, if  either
can be so judged.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to brjng to  the forefront the issues  which
distinguish the two different  adjusted  monetary  base  measures. In
principle,  the construction  of  the two series dpply the same  methodology--
one that  seems  quite sensible  for  "dollarizingrr reserve  requiienent ratio
changes. Although  cosmetic  differences emerge  in  the implementation  of  this
methodology,  other, perhaps  more  substantiative, issues  arise concerning
what constitutes a reserve  requirement  ratio  policy actjon.  Certainly,
disparate treatment  of  past Federal  Reserve  actions and  what those actions
mean  for  measuring  reserve  requirement  ratio  changes  wanant investigation.
l.rle  further  attempt  to  infer  the importance  of  the alternatjve strategies by
examining  these  two  neasures  in their abilities  to explain  changes  in
nominal  GNP. It  is  useful to  future research  that  investiqators know  which
neasure  bears the closest relationshio to GNP.
The  two nain results forwarded  in thjs  paper  suggest  that  one base
neasure  does  outperforn  the other series in  explaining  novements  in  nominal
GNP  growth in  the 1960s  and 1970s. Evidence  presented  for  the 1980s,
however,  does  not strongly favor either base  measure. The instab.il.it.ies  in
the base-GNP  relationship  during  the 1980s  indicate  the difficulties
involved in  accounting  for  reserve  requirement  rat.io changes  that were
'introduced  by the Monetary  Control Act of  1980.
The  paper is  organized  as follows: Section  2 describes  the two
different  methods  ernployed  to  adjust the source  base  for  changes  in  reserverequirements. Section  3 examines  some  of  the issues involved in  estimating
the  base-GNP  relationship.  Section  4 provides  the ernpirical  evidence  of
the relationship between  the two bases  and  nominal  GNP. Section 5 compares
the relative  predjctive power  of  each  base.  Section  6 provides  a brief
sunmary  of  the  resu  I  ts.
II.  Adjustinq for  Reserve  Requjrements  Changes
Both  the Board  of Governor's  monetary  base  measure  and  the St.  Louis
adjusted  monetary  base  measure  share  the source  base--a  measure  which  omits
the effects of  reserve  requirenent  ratio  changes. This cotnnon  ground
focuses  on movements  in  the Federal  Reserve  System's  consolidated  balance
sheet as they pertain to  base  changes. It  is  useful to  characterjze  the
source  base  before describing  the adjustment  procedure  used  to  capture
reserve requirement  ratio  changes.
Fornal1y,  the source  base  js calculated  as follows:
(1)SB=A-NML,
where  SB  denotes  the source  base;  A, Federal  Reserve  assets;, and Nlill, the
non-rnonetary  liabjlities  of  the Federal  Reserve. l'lon-monetary  liabilities
are the sun of  all  Federal  Reserve  liability  and  equity accounts  less
Federal  Reserve  credit.  Federal  Reserve  credit  consists of  Federal  Reserve
notes outstanding  and  of  fjnancial  institutions  deposits at  Federal  Reserve
banks.
According  to  equation  (1),  changes  in  the source  base  account  for
Federal  Reserve  balance  sheet  transactions.  Traditiona.l  ly,  economists  have
considered  the monetary  authority as being  endowed  with three pol  icy tools:(1) open  market  operations; (2) discount  window  lendjngs; and (3) reserve
requirement  ratio  changes. Both  open  market  operations  and  discount  window
lending directly  involve Federal  Reserve  asset trdnsactions.  Accordingly,
source  base  changes  reflect  changes  due  to open  market  operations  and
djscount window  I  end  ing  .
Reserve  requirement  ratjo  changes,  however,  do not involve ba'lance
sheet transations, and, therefore, are omitted from directly  affecting the
source  base.  Although  reductions  in reserve  requirement  ratids  are
generally perceived  as expansionary  rnonetary  policy actions, for  example,
these  actions  alone  will  not gjve rise to alterations  in the Federal
Reserve's  assets  or 
'l 
iabilitjes.  Hence,  the source  base  would  indicate
policy  inactivity  despite reserve  requirenent  ratio  changes  being
undertaken.  4/
This oversight has long been  recognized. Both  the Federal  Reserve  Bank
of  St.  Louis (hereafter "St.  Lou.is")  and  the Bodrd  of  Governors  (hereafter
I'Board")  have  estimated  alternative base  measures  to  correct for  this
defect.  In effect,  both neasures  attenpt to  0dollarizel this  pol  icy action
by capturing the amount  of  reserves  freed (absorbed)  by reserve requirement
reductions (increases).  llhen  combjned  with the source  base, the outcome  of
the  adjustment procedures  yield  a sunmary  measure  of  al I  Federal Reserve
policy actions.
The  essence  of  the adjustment  used  by St.  Louis and  by the Board  nay be
illustrated  by modifying  the relationship between  the source  base  and  Ml,
also known  as the money  nultiplier,  such  that reserve  requirement  ratio
changes  do not djrectly  affect the money  nultipl ier.  Constructing  an
adjusted  nonetary  base  is,  therefore, a simple  algebraic manipulation  of  thebase-Ml  relationship whereby  changes  in  reserve  requirement  ratios  affect
ttll through  the base  neasure,  instead  of  through  the noney  multiplier.
To formalize this  mod.ification,  note that the noney  supply and  source
base  are defined as:
(2)Ml  =  C  +0
(3)SB  =  C  +  RR +  ER!/
where  C denotes  currency  held by the non-bank  public;  D, total  checkable
deposits; RR,  required reserves;  and  ER,  excess  reserves.  Dividing the
right-hand  side of equations  (2) and  (3) bV  D  yields:
(2')  Ml  =(l+s)D
(3')  SB  =(s+p+e)D,
where  s = C/D; p = RR/D;  and  e = ER/D. Taking  equation  (2')  and
substituting  for D using  equation  (3') yields the fanil'iar money  multiplier
(cf- Burger  (1971),  for example):
(4)  Ml  =(1  +s)SB/(s+p+e).
Equation  (4) characterizes  the approach  wherein  reserve  requirernent  ratio
changes  induce  noney  supply  changes  through  the noney  multiplier.  Note  that
the noney  nultiplier,  MI/SB,  is  a function  of the policy variable, p.
Define  B' 6/
(5)  B'=SB  -pD  =(s+e)D.
Now  using  the last term  jn equation  (5) to substitute  for D in equation  (2')results  in  the following characteri  zat  i  on:
(6)  l'41 = (1 + s) B, ,/ (s + e).
Note  that  in  equation  (6),  reserve  requirement  changes,  and hence  all  policy
actions, affect  Ml through  the base  neasure.  The  money  multiplier,  Ml/B',
now  reflects  private sector behaviolin  the form of  currency-to-depos  i  t
ratios  decided  on by households  and  excess  reserves-to-depos  i  t  ratios  chosen
by banks.  The  money  multiplier,  t'|l/B',  is  .independent  of  poficy forces in
the form of  changes  in  p.
2.1 A Brief  Compari  son: St.  Louis and  the Board
In principle,  the Board  and  St.  Louis adopt  sinilar  nethodologies  to
estimate  the effects of  reserve  requjrement  ratio  adjustnents.  Still.
subtle, and  potentially important,  differences  exist.
The  three main  points of dlfference between  the St.  Louis adjusted
monetary  base and the monetary  base constructed by the Board are:
(i)
(ii)
the base  period wei  ght;
treatment  of  vault cash  of  nonbound  instjtutionsT/;
and
(iji) treament  of  growth  in rnoney  market  deposit accounts.
The effect  of  differences in  the base  weight wjll  show  up as differences in
the levels of  the alternatjve nonetary  base  measures. Disparate  treatment
of  vault cash and  money  market  deposit accounts  will  contribute to  changes
in  the growth  paths of  the two policy sunmary  measures.S/
2.2 The  Different Base  Periods
To illustrate  the different  strategies employed  with respect to  the
base  period  weights,  consider  the following  exanple. In the St. Loujsprocedurer  a reserve adiustment  magnitude  (RAil)  is  calculated based  on the
fol I  owi  nq:
(7) RAMI = (ru  -  r1),  Dj,
where  r  denotes  the (column)  vector of  reserve  requirement  ratios  and D' the
(column)  vector of  deposit types against  which  reserves  nust be held.
Equation  (7) indicates that  RAtl  is  neasured  in dollar  terms.  Subscript t
denotes  an arbitrary  time period and  b denotes  the base  period-  By
defjnition,  RAM  in  the base  period (period t=b) is  zero.!/
Equation  (7) indicates that an increase  in reserve requirement  ratios
relative  to  the base  period results in  RAM  fa11ing.  In other words, higher
reserve requirement  ratios  absorb  reserves.  Note  also that  RAil  calculates
the effect  of  the reserve  requirement  change  based  on the deposit level  in
period t.  RAll  is  isolating the difference in  required reserves  relatjve  to
the base  period dependent  upon  the deposit level  in the arbitrary  time
period.  A.lternatively, for  example  in the current period' RAM  captures
differences between  required reserves  today and  what  required reserves  would
be under  the base  period's reserve  schedule. To obtain AMB,  the source  base
i s s  jmply added  to  RM:
MB1  =SB1  +  RAMI'
In constructing  their  serjes, the Board  uses  a multiplicatjve  "weight"
to  capture changes  in reserve  requirements. In the Board  procedure'  the
current period is  treated as the base  period.  In effect,  the Board
adjustrnent  schene  updates  past adiusted  reserve 1eve1s  every tjme reserve
requirement  ratio  changes. The  lreight, which js  the ratio  of  base (current)period to  past reserve  requirement  ratios,  sets I'adjusted"  reserves  equal to
unadjusted  reserves  in the base  (current) period.  In other words, like  St.
Louis, the Board  sets source  base  equal to  the monetary  base in the base
period.l0/  In contrast to  the St.  Louis  procedure,  however,  the Board
adjusts required reserves  relative  to  a past deposit levels.
Formally! a change  in  reserve  requirenents  in  the current perjod would
adjust past period be according  to  the Board  as follows:
(8)  TRA1-5  = rt-s'  Dt-s (rt'  Dj /  r1-5' D1),
s = 1, 2, 3, ...,
where  TRA  denotes  the "adjusted"  required reserves  of  financial
institutions.  Equation  (B) shows  how  the Board  adjusts past required
reserves  relative  to  the current period.  In any past time period denoted  t-
s,  the Boardrs  adjustnent  uses  a weighted  ratio  of  the vector of  reserve
requirement  ratios  in  time period t  to  the past period.
Adding  currency  held by the non-bank  public will  yield the Board's
monetary  base  adjusted  for  reserve  requirement  changes. Let the level of
unadiusted  reserves  in  any period t-s,  s > 0,  be defined as r1-5'  01-r.
Again, adding  the level of  currency  held by the nonbank  public to  unadjusted
reserves  will  yield  the Board's  monetary  base.  The  difference between  the
alternative Board  measures  (i.e.,  the adjusted  and  unadjusted  monetary  base
measures)  is obtained  by subtracting  the unadjusted  reserves  from equatjon
(8), thus  yielding:
(9) BAFI-5 = (rt  -  rt-s)'  Ot-s,  for all  s > 0,where  BAF  denotes  the Board's  adjustment  factor.
Equation  (9) is  similar to equation  (7) in the sense  that higher
reserve requ  irenent ratios  result  in reserves  in period t-s  being larger
than in  the cuffent or base  period (i.e..  denoted  period t).  For exanple.
if  reserve requirernent  ratios lrere  rajsed today, RAM  would  be negative  and
BAF  wou'ld  be equal to  zero.  Relative to  the previous  period, i.  e.,  period
t-I,  both the Board  and  St.  Louis  would  have  smaller BAF  and  RAl'l,
respectively.
In effect,  the Board  is  comparing  past required reserves  to what
required reserves  would  have  been  with current reserve  requirements  in
place.  Equation  (9),  however,  weights  the change  in  reserve  requirements  by
the deposit level  in  perjod t-s,  whereas  St.  Louis uses  the current period
deposit level.  Except  in the special  case  where  deposit  levels are
unchanged  relative to the base  period, (i.e.,  D1_s  = Dt in our example)  the
levels of  the adjustments,  and  hence,  the levels of  the alternative monetary
bases  will  be different.  In our example,  an increase  in reserve
requirements  in the curent period,  for  instance,  wilI  result in the
Eoard's  measure  being larger than the 5t.  Louis  measure  in  period t  and in
some  arbitrary  period t-s.
2.3 The  Treatnent  of Vault Cash
Differences  also appear  jn  how  the two nethods  treat  vault cash  of
nonbound  financial  institutions.  The  Board  simply adds  the cash  balances
which exceed  required reserves  dollar  for  dollar  into  the monetary  base
measure. This approach  anounts  to  the same  tredtment  to  such  balances  as
that  given to  currency  held by the publ.ic  in  calculating the monetary  base.
That js,  after  adjusting for  reserve  requirement  ratio  changes,  the Boardsimply adds  the currency  held
held by nonbound  jnstitutions
excess  vault cash  of  nonbound
Eg.
by the publjc and  the excess  cash  reserves
to get the monetary  base.  The  contribution of
financial  institutions  is  formaily denoted  as
St.  Louis, however,  treats excess  cash  balances  as being either freed
or  absorbed  by reserve  requ  irenent ratio  changes. To il-lustrate,  suppose
there js  a change  in  reserve  requirements  for  nonbound  fjnancial
institutjons.  According  to  the St.  Louis adjustment  procedufg,  the change
'in reserve requjrements  would  result  in  a change  in  RA|t|  given by (16 -  r;)'
D1, where  the superscript, N, denotes  the appl'ication  of  the po1  icy action
to  nonbound  financjal  institutions.  Cornpari  ng the alternative
methodologies,  the total  contribution of  the excess  cash  balances  to  the St.
Louis adjusted  monetary  base  in  the current perjod wjll  be E1  + (rb -  rt)'
01.  In contrast, the Board  asserts that the contribution of  this  excess
vault  cash  to  the monetary  base  is  equal to  E1.
The importance  of  the contrasting treatments  of  vault cash  was
heightened  by the Monetary  Control Act of  1980  (MCA). After  1980,  all
depository institutions  became  subject to  the same  reserve  requ  i  renents.  11/
Typically,  nonbound  institutions  were  not members  of  the Federal  Reserve.
Consequently,  MCA  meant  a change  in  reserve  requirements  for  these
institutions,  and  subsequently  divergent  nonetary  base  neasures.
2.4 The  Treatment  of  MM0AS
Another  product  of  financjal deregulation  was  the 'intoduction  of  money
market  deposit accounts  (I{MDAs).  St.  Louis chose  to  treat  the authorjzatjon
of  MMDAS  as a policy action.  To the extent that  funds  were  transferred fron
other  transactions accounts  into  i;lMDAs,  and because  Ml,lDAs  were not  subject
10to  reserve requirenents,  reserves  were  freed by the Federal  Reserve's
authorization.  The  Board,  however,  opted  to  not adjust for  growth  for
deviations in  the growth  in  personal  MMDAs.  Obviously,  the growth  of  MM0AS
would  account  for  deviatjons jn  the growth  of  the alternative nonetary  bases
through  their  effect  on growth  in the St.  Louis RAM.
In summary,  the St.  Louis approach  tends  to  treat  a broader  set of
decisions as po1  icy actions than does  the Board.  St,  Louis, treatment  of
nonbound  jnstitutions  and  money  narket deposit accounts  as poljcy actions
contrasts  the Boardrs  laissez-faire  tactics.  The  question  then is to
determine  whether  these alternative strategies matter hrith respect to
changes  in  nominai  GNP. Differences  in  estimating  the two series. such  as
those  discussed,  will  give rise to sl  ightiy different time series.
Consequently,  the two neasures  will  explain novements  in  nonjnal GNP
di  fferentiy.
III.  The  Model
In thjs  section, we  compare  the two adjusted  monetary  base  series in
their  ability  to explain  nominal  GNP  behavior. This js done  by estimating
a reduced-forn  equation  reiating GNP  growth  to  (separately)  to  growth  in
each  of  the base  series,  A conparison  of  the nominal  GNP  specifications
with the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  and  the Board  monetary  base
separately  considered  has four possible  outcomes. Either the approach  used
by St.  Louis adds inforrnation  useful in  explaining nominal  GNP  behavior
compared  to  the procedures  adopted  by the Board,  the Board's  methodology
contrjbutes more  information  compared  to  that contributed  by the St.  Louis
measure,  both marginal  ly  contribute information, or there is  no difference
11in  the procedures  adopted. For instance,  the treatment  of  Mt{DAs  as a policy
action by St.  Louis  may  yield  additional infornation useful in explaining
changes  in noninal GNP. It  is  also possible that  the Board's  treatment  as a
non-poijcy action is  supported  jn  the context of  explaining noninal GNP.
Alternatively,  it  is  possible  that  some  convex  combination  of  the two
procedures  best explains such  that both measures  marginally contrjbute to
explaining  changes  in GNP  growth. Finally, this particular po.licy  action
was small and  unimportant  jn  terms  of  expjainjng  movements  in  GNP  growth
and, hence,  the differences do not matter.
Another  fundamental  jssue Js imbedded  in  a nominal  GNP  specification
which includes a monetary  base  neasure.  Specifically,  the simple sum
approach  to  estinating the nonetary  base  presumes  that  a change  in  reserve
requirements  giving nise to  $1 change  in  the monetary  base  has  the same
effect  on nominal  GNP  as a $1 change  in  the source  base.  The  validity  of
this  restriction is,  however,  a testable  hypothesjs.
3.1 The  Estimatinq  Equati  on
A simple, reduced-form  model  specification is  adopted  to  exanine
whether  growth in the St.  Louis' or Board's  monetary  base  measures  better
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where  Y denotes  nominal  GNP;  B, a monetary  base  measure;  and, FG  is  the
high-employment  government  budget  surplus.  The latter  term is  included  to
al low for  fiscal  pol  icy effects.  Dots  above  the variables denote  growth
rates.
L2Because  our interest focuses  on the importance  of  RAM  and  this  measure
is  not seasonally  adjusted  by the St.  Louis bank,  not seasonally  adjusted
data are used  throughout  the following empirical tests.  To allow for
seasonal  variation  in  all  variables, we  calculate year-over-year  changes
using quarterly observation  as follows:
(  11)  x1
xt  -  xt-4
(x1 +  x1_g/z
Taking  four quarter differences  with quarterly observatjons  should  allow for
much  of  the conrmon  guarterly seasonal  pattern in  both series.l2l
3.2 Lag Lenqth  Sel  ect  i  on
An important  issue is  the iag-length structure postulated  in  equation
(10).  This equation  postulated,  ad hoc, four lags on all  variables.  !.|ould
an alternative  lag structure yield  different  results?  To address  this
question, final  prediction error criteria  were  used  to  select the optimal
lag length for  the base  neasure  and  government  budget  surplus.  The  results
from the estinations incorporating  the optimal 1ag  length are unjformly
consistent with results forwarded  using the ad hoc lag structure in  equation
(10).  Consequently,  the lag structure used  throughout  thjs  paper includes
four  lags on both the monetary  base  varjable and  the high-employment
governrnent  budget  surplus vari  ab  I  e.
3.3 Stability of the Modet
Data are avajlable for  the period 1959I  -  198BII.  A number  of
substantiatjve changes  were introduced  during this  period.  The  scope  of
these changes,  such  as those  enacted  in  the Monetary  Control Act of  19BO
(MCA),  or the introduction of  MMDAS,  was  so broad  that  instabitity  in  the
13rnodel  is plausible.  A Chow  test was  used  to test the stability  of the
relationship given by equation  (10) for  both base  neasures.  In both cases
the nu1l hypothesis  that  the post-1979  period has the sane  relationsh.ip  as
the pre-1980  relationsh.ip  was  rejected.13/  Thus, in  our first  analysis we
consider  the sample  period 1959I  -  1979IV,  which  tests  indicated is  a stable
relationship.  The  post-1979  period is  held out for  subsequent  out-of-sample
i  nvest  igat  i  on.
IV.  Is  There  a Relationship  Between  Nominal  GNp
in  thjs  section, we  proceed  with estimating  the nodel presented  above
to  compare  the two adjusted  monetary  base  measures  in  terms  of  explain.ing
nominal  GNP  behvjor.  In addition, we jnvest.lgate  whether  an implicit
restriction  jmposed  on the effects of  the adjusted  monetary  base  components
on the nominal  GNP  is valid.
4.1 The  St.  Louis  Adjusted  l,4onetary  Base
The  effect  of  changes  in  the growth  rate in  the St.  Louis adjusted
monetary  base  on nomjnal  GNP  growth  can be considered  from two perspectives:
the short-run and  the long-run.  Table 1 reports the parameter  estimates
obtained  using the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  'in equation  (10).
Although  none  of the indivjdual  coefficients  are significantly different
fron zero, two pieces  of  evidence  suggest  that a relationship betbreen  the
adjusted  nonetary  base  growth  and  nomjnal  GNp  growth  exjsts.  A hypothes.is
that  the sum  of  the four lagged  coefficients on the adjusted  monetary  base
equal zero is  rejected.  Moreover.  the hypothesis  that the long-run
multiplier  (estjmated  to be 0.8835)  equals  one  is  not rejected  (F(1.63)  =
0.86).  Failure  to reject the hypothesis  of unity long-run  elast.icity is
14consistent with adjusted  monetary  base  growth  being  proportional to  nominal
GNP  growth.  Fundanentally,  both of  these hypothesis  are consistent with
changes  in  St.  Louis  monetary  base  growth  being  related to  nominal  GNP
growth.
Using  adjusted  monetary  base  growth  in the specification implicitly
imposes  the  restriction  that  changes  in  RAIi|  growth have the  same  effect  on
noninal GNP  growth  as changes  in  source  base  growth.  To investigate the
validity  of  this  restriction,  adjusted  rnonetary  base  growth  is  decomposed
into  the contribution from changes  in  RAM  and  the contribution from changes
in  source  base,l4l  l^|ith  the inclusion of  the St.  Lou.is  RAM  variable in  the
nominal  GNP  equation, it  is  possjble to  address  the jssue of whether  changes
in  the source  base  growth  (relative to  the adjusted  monetary  base  growth)
exert different  effects on nomjnal  GNP  growth  than changes  in  RAM  grohrth.
Estimation  results for  the new,  expanded  regression  are reported in
Table 2.  The  coefficient on the first  lag of  the St.  Louis RAM  (SRAM)
variable is  significantly  different  from zero and  close to  unity.  Four
separate  hypothesjs  were  considered  corresponding  to the each  of  the
coefficients  on the lagged  St.  Louis RAM  variables being equal to  source
base  counterparts,  i.e.,  SRAMi  = SSBi,  for  i  = 1to  4.  In each  case,  the
hypothesis  is  not rejected.  In addition, a joint  hypothesis  that  the
coefficients were  all  equal simultaneously  was  considered. The  joint  test
statistic,  F(4,59)  = 2.26, provided  only narginal  evidence  in favor of
decomposing  the adjusted  nonetary  base.  Thus,  the evidence  generally
supports  the implicit  restrictions  imposed  by the simple  sum  approach. In
other words, a one-percentage  point increase  (decrease)  in  source  base
growth  has the same  effect  on nominal  GNP  growth  as a one-percentage  point
15-increase  (decrease)  in  SRAM  ach.ieved  through  reserve  requirement  changes.
The  equality in  the estimated  shocks  to  source  base  and  SRAM  suggest
that  there is  no advantage  to  looking at each  component  separate'ly.
Combining  these effects.  as done  in the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base,
does  not apparently  destroy any useful information.
In summary,  changes  in  nominal  GNP  growth  are related to  changes  in
St.  Loujs adjusted  monetary  base  growth  in  a reduced-form  setting.  The
results with the St.  Louis  measure  suggest  that the long-run elasticity  of
nominal  GNP  growth  with respect to St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  growth
'is not different  from unity.  Further, the evidence  suggests  that  no gain is
achieved  by decomposing  adjusted  monetary  base  growth  jnto  source  base  and
RAM  components.  In effect, thjs result validates  the implicit restirction
imposed  when  specifying the adjusted  monetary  base  that changes  in  RAM  have
the same  effect  on noninal GNP  as chanqes  in  source  base.
4.2 The  Board  Monetary  Base
The  Boardrs  adjustnent  procedure  is  now  investigated.  How  well  does
the Board's  adjustrnent  for  reserve  requirement  changes,  and  hence  their
summary  measure  of nonetary  poiicy actions, explain movenents  jn  nominal  GNP
growth? Table 3 reports the results usjng the Board's  base  neasure  in
equation  (10).  None  of individual  coefficients  on the lagged  Board  base
variables  are statistically  significant.  The  hypothesis  that the sum  of the
coefficients on the base  variables equals  zero, however,  is rejected.  This
finding  suggests  that the Board  monetary  base  growth  is  related to  changes
in  noninal GNP  growth.  The  long-run  multiplier  also suggests  the presence
of  a Board  base-income  relationship.  Contrary  to  the 5t.  Louis measure,
16however,  the hypothesis  that the long-run  elasticity  (here estinated to  be
0.7447) is  equal to  unity is  rejected (at the 7%  level) when  the Board
measure  is  specified  (F(1,61)  = 3.54).
Table 4 reports regression  results considering  the inclusion of  Board's
adiustnent  factor  (BAF)  variable along  with the contribution of  the
unadjusted  base  to monetary  base  growth.  The  coefficient  on the first
lagged  BAF  variable  js marginally  significant and  close  to unity.  The  Board
measure  also implictly  inrposes  the restrictions  that the effects of  base
growth  and  adjustment  growth  (relative  to monetary  base  growth)  are the
identica'l  .  In the separate  tests that each  pair of  lagged  of  coeffjcients
are equal, the hypothesis  is  not rejected for  the second,  third  and  fourth
lagged  values.  Marginal  evidence  exists for  the hypothesis  that  the first
lagged  coefficients  are different (F(1.59)  = 3.59).  The  joint  hypothesis
that  the four  lagged  coefficients for  the decomposed  Board  monetary  base  is
not rejected  at the five-percent  level (F(4,59)  = 1.89).  Thus,  the data
generally suggest  that combining  the two conponents  is  acceptable.
4.3 Both Measures  Simu  ltaneously
Since the two alternative base  series purport to neasure  the same
thing--a  sunmary  measure  of monetary  policy actions--the.ir  comparison  is
highly useful.  The  results in reported in Tables  l  and  3 indicate somewhat
disparate findings for  the two measures. First,  with the unity  long-run
elast'icity  as a benchnark  for  a monetary  polJcy variable, the data suggest
that the St. Loujs  base  is consistent  with this hypothesis,  wh'ile  the Board
base  is  not.
Second,  the adjusted  R2  suggest  slightly  different  explanatory  power
for  the djfferent  measures. Again, the St.  Louis version appears  to  provide
17better  expl  anatory power  lrith  an R2 of  0.814 versus an R2 of  0.798 lrhen  the
Board  neasure  is  specified.  Although  both of  these findings seem  to  favor
St.  Loujs base, it  is hardly convincing  evidence  that  the St.  Loujs
adjustrnent  procedure  is  better.
Two  further means  of  conparison  are useful.  First,  a formal
specification test,  developed  by Pesaran  (1974),  wj11 be used  to  atternpt  to
djscriminate between  the two models. Second,  the relative  contribution that
the differing  series may  have  jn  explaining  GNP  developments.  Oepending  on
the outcome  of  the first  investigation, this  last  comparison  looks into
whether  one procedure  augments  the information  coning  from the 'rbest"
procedure. That is,  by including  both measures  simultaneously  in  nominal
GNP  growth  regression,  does  the loser of  the specification test  contribute
further  explanatory  power.
Neither the Board  nor St.  Louis  procedures  are nested  inside the other.
Consequently,  it  is appropriate  to  apply the non-nested  test  methodology
developed  by Pesaran. In the Pesaran  procedure,  the researcher  chooses  the
"true" model,  which  is  specified  as the model  of the null hypothesjs. The
competing  nodel is  then set as the alternative model.  Pesaran  jnterprets
rejecting the null  hypothesis  is  consistent  with the rejecting the null
model  in favor of the alternative  model. In this  investigation,  the
original null  hypothesis  is that the Board's  model  is  the "true"
specification.  The  test statistic for the Pesaran  test is distributed as a
standard  normal  .  In our case  the test  statistic  is  calculated to  be -3.18.
Thus,  the hypothesis  is rejected  at the five percent  level.l5l  The  data
suggest  that the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  is  preferred over the
model  using the Board  measure.
18It  is  still  possible that  the different  adjustment  procedures  would
give rise  to  some  contributions from the Board  monetary  base  supplementing
information already i  ncorporated  from the St.  Louis base.  A simple  way  to
address  this  issue is  by specifying a regression  with St.  Louis adiusted
monetary  base  and  deviations between  the St.  Louis and  the Board  measures
included.  Table 5 reports the regression  results for  such  an experiment.
In this  setting,  there is  rnarginal  evidence  that  the first  lagged
coefficient  on the St.  Louis base  is  different  from zero.  Nune  of  the
indivjdual coefficients on the lagged  deviation variables, however,  are
statistically  statistically  significant.  In addition, a joint  test that alI
the lagged  deviations coefficients equal zero is  not rejected (F(a,59) =
1.53).  Given  the evidence  that the St. Louis  adjusted  nonetary  base  is
better,  includ'ing  the deviation term anounts  to  testing the marginal
information  contribution made  by the Board  neasure  over and  above  the
i  nfornrati  on contributed  by the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base.  The  data
suggests  that  the Board  measure  does  not contribute inforrnation  useful  in
explaining movements  in  nomina1  GNP  growth, at  least over the 1959-  1979
sample  peri  od.
V.Out-of-Sample  I  nformat  i  on
Attention is  now  turned  to  the
out-of-sample  over the horizon 1980I
were calculated for  the perjod.  In
stronger tests of  the model  because
was  unstable  after  l979IV.
ability  to explain  nominal  GNP  growth
-  1987iV.  One-step  ahead  forecasts
a sense,  out-of-sample  comparisons  are
of  the evidence  presented  that  the model
Generally, comparisons  of  alternative forecasts use sample  mean  square
19error  infonnation.  For example,  Goldfeld (1973)  used  the root mean  square
error conparisons  to  compare  competing  specifications of  the money  demand
function.  Ashley. Granger  and  Schmalenesee  (1980)  also base  forecasting
comparisons  on the samp'le  nean  square  effor.  lle will  look at  both the root
mean  square  error and  the sample  statistics  forwarded  by Ashley, et  al  as
basis for  comparing  the rrquality"  of  the one-step  ahead  forecasts usjng the
St.  Lou'is  and  Board  base  measures.
Table 6 reports the one-step  ahead  forecast erors  for  the period 1980I
-  1987IV  usjng both the St.  Louis and  the Board  rnodel  s estimated  previously.
After  L982II, the forecast errors are (with only one  exception)  positive
regardless  of  the nonetary  base  measure. Thus, the data suggest  that  the
equations  estimated  over the period 1959I  -  19791V  systematicaliy  over-
predict nomjnal  GNP  growth  throughout  most  of  the 1980s. Thjs evidence  is
consistent with a slowing  in the nonetary  base  velocity growth  rate  in  the
post-1982I  I  period.  16,/
Table 7 reports the root  nean square errors  of  the forecasts over the
1980I -  1987IV  period as well as several sub-periods  during the 1980s.  Over
the entire forecast sample,  the root nean  square  emor is  slightly  lower for
nominal  GNP  growth  forecasts using the St.  Louis  measure. Similarly,  over
the period 1980I  -  1982IV,  the forecasts generated  using the St.  Louis
adjusted  nonetary  base  do better.  The  hypothesis  that  the root mean  square
errors are equal is  not rejected for  ejther forecast samp.le. Results  using
the Ashely, et  al  procedure  are also consistent  with the hypothesis  that  the
St.  Louis model  does  not offer  significant  improvement  over the Board  model
in  terms of  forecasting over either period.l7l
Table 7 also reports root mean  square  errors calculated for  two
20additional sub-periods. Because  MltlDAs  were introduced  in  1983, it  would  be
interesting to  see how  including 1983  forecasts emors affected root mean
square  calculations.  Also the introduction of  contemporaneous  reserve
accounting  in  1984  may  affect forecasting nominal  GNP  growth.  To examine
how  this  change  affected forecasts €frors;  the root nean  square  errors were
calculated for  the period 1984I  -  19B7IV. In both cases, the root mean
square  forecasts usjng the Board  model  were  smaller than those using the St.
Louis adjusted  nonetary  base.  The  hypothesis  that the root mean  square
errors were  equal  for  both sub-periods  is  not rejected.
In  summary,  the evidence  does  not suggest  that either model  produces
better forecasts over the 1980s. Thus, in  contrast to  the in-sample
results,  the out-of-sample  inforrnation  do not strongly favor using the St.
Loujs adjusted monetary  base forecasts over the Board  monetary  base
forecasts for  nominal  GNP  growth.
V  I .  Sunmary
This paper  has examined  the relationship between  the two adiusted
monetary  base  measures  and  nominal  GNP. Using  the adjusted  monetary  base
growth  variables to  explain noninal  GNP  growth  first  raises the question
whether  decomposing  the adjusted  monetary  base  into  reserve  requirement
adjustment  component  and  source  base  component  is  useful.  The  findings
presented  here are consistent  wjth a one  percentage  point increase  in
monetary  base  growth  due  to  reserve  requirement  ratio  changes  have  the same
effect  on nomjnal  GNP  growth  as if  one  percentage  point increase  was  due to
source  base  growth, regardless  of the adjustment  measure. Thus, both
decompositions  make  sense  .
2lThe  evidence  provided  in  th'is paper  also suggests  that  the St.  Louis
adjustment  procedure  may  be slightly  more  appropriate  than the Board
adJustment  procedure  in  explaining  the 1959  -  1979  period.  Perhaps  the
rnost  compelling  evidence  is  the use  of  specification tests.  The
specifjcation tests also are consistent  with favoring the St.  Louis
adjusted monetary  base model  over the Board  nonetary base model.  In  the
out-of-sample  period, 1980  -  1987,  however,  there was  little  d'ifference
between  the ability  of  the two base  neasures  to  predict nominal  G P
behavi  or  -
22FOOTNOTES
1.  Evjdence  supporting  the adjusted  monetary  base  as the appropriate
monetary  policy variabie to  control nominal  GNP  as been  provided  in  Andersen
(1975)  and in Andersen  and  Karnosky  (L977).  More  recently McCal'lurn  (1982)
has proposed  a monetary  base ruie  based  on monetary  base behavior.
2.  This quote  was  taken  from Futures,  July 1988,  pg. 40




the Federal  Reserve,"  Lindley  H. Clark  Jr.,  tlalI Street
1988.
4.  Haslag  and  Hein (1989)  compare  alternative specifications of  a nominal
GNP  equation  with source  base  and  the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  as
the measures  of monetary  poiicy.  This paper  shows  that reserve  requirement
ratio  changes  do natter for  stabilization  purposes.
5.  Technically, source  base  is  defined as the difference between  sources
and uses  of  the base.  operationally, sources  are Federal  Reserve  assets and
uses are non-monetary  liabiljties  of  the Federal  Reserve. Equation  (3)
specifies source  base  to  a function of  Federal  Reserve  cred.it, or the
rnonetary  liabilites  of  the Federal  Reserve. Double-entry  accounting  implies
that  a necessary  and  sufficient  condjtion for  changes  in  the source  base is
that Federal  Reserve  credit changes.  Hence,  equation  (3) is equivalent  to
the formal definition  of  the source  base.
236.  This exanple  assumes  that the only reserveble  deposits are D.
7.  The  tenn "nonboundl  refers to  those  depository institutions  whjch
maintain vault cash  balances  in  excess  of  their  reouired reserves.
8.  See  Gilbert  (1983)  for  a more  detajled exposition  of  the differences
between  the Board  and  St.  Louis adjustment  procedures.
9.  The issues invojved  with selecting the base  period are by no means
trivial  .  Gilbert  (1980)  and  Tatom  (1980)  identify  some  the problems
inherent to  the Depository  Institution  Deregulation  and  Monetary  Control Act
of  1980.  In effect,  the scope  of  the reforms  introduced  in this  legjslatlon
\.rere  very broad.  In particuiar.  it  was  difficult  to  select one  period
where  institutional  comparabi.lity  was  maintained  before and  after  the base
period.  Thus, making  the l'ink between  pre- and  post-deregu  1  at  i  on critjcal  .
10.  It  is  important  to  note that the Board's  unadjusted  base  is  different
from the source  base.  The  construction  of  the source  lends itself  to
account  for  changes  in  currency  issued  by the Treasury,  whereas  the Board
unadJusted  base  is  effectjvely  Federal  Reserve  Credit which  does  not jnclude
Treasury  currency.  Consequently,  decomposing  into source  base  and
adjustnent factor  components  are not relative  to  the  sane source base.  l.Je
continue  to  use this  terminology  simply  our of  convenience, The  Board
refers to  their  source  base  counterpart  as the "monetary  base  not adjusted
for  reserve requ  i  renents"  .
2411.  Toma  (1988)  provides  a historicat  review  of  the changes  introduced  by
0IoMCA,  specifjcally  with respect  to  reserve  requirement  ratio  changes.
After  1980,  the Federal  Reserve  monopolized  reserve  requirement  ratios.
Before 1980,  however. Toma  clains that prior  to DIDMCA's  imposition  of
uniform reserve requirement  ratios  a competitive  environment  exjsted for
these ratios,  due  to  the cornpetition  between  state banking  authorities and
the Federal  Reserve  System.
L2.  Charts 1-  4 are the autocorrelation  functions for  the following
variables (each  first  transfonned  according  to equation  (11)):  nomjnal  GNP.
the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base,  the Board  monetary  base  adjusted  for
reserve requirement  ratjo  changes  and  the high-employment  governnent  budget
surplus.  The  autocoffelation  functions suggest  that  all  the variables are
stat  ionary.
13.  The  values of  the F test  for  St.  Louis and  the Board  to  deterrnine  the
stabiljty  over  the entire sample  are F(13,84)  = 2.60  and  F(13,84)  2.08,
respectively.
L4.  Source  base  and  RAM  changes  are measured  in relation  to  the St.  Louis
adjusted  nonetary  base (SAMB).  That is,
SSBI  = (SBs  -  SBt-q) /  (SAMB;  + SAltlBl-4)/z
where  SSB  denotes  the contribution of  source  base  growth  to  adjusted
monetary  base  growth.  S  i  mi  1ar1y,
SRAMI =  (RAMI  -  RAft-a) /  (SAl4Bt  + SAft_4)/z,
where  SRAM  is  the contribution of  RAM  growth  to  adjusted  nonetary  base
25grwoth.  This decomposition  means  that SMBX  = SSBI +  SRAI!{1.  Use  of  the
decomposition  technique  facilitates  testing the hypothesis  that  a 1
percentage  lncrease in  the  source base  component  has the same  effect  on
nominal GNP  growth as a one percentage  point  increase in  the  RAM  component.
15.  Pesaran  indicates that the specification test  may  not be symmetric.
For completeness,  the specification test was  specified with the null  and
alternative hypotheses  reversed.  t^ljth  the St.  Louis  measure  ts  the null
hypothesis,  the specificat'ion  test statistic was  calculated  to be -0.15.
Because  we  fajl  to reject the null hypothesis,  this result is consistent
wjth the St.  Louis adjusted  monetary  base  bejng  the "better" of  the two
models.
16.  The  rule  set forth  by McCa1lum  said that monetary  base  growth  should
respond  inverseiy  to velocity shifts,  Accordingly,  the decljne  in velocity
growth  in  the eariy 1980s  would  have  induced  higher base  growth  for  the same
nominal  GNP  growth  path.
17.  For the record, in  both cases  the mean  forcasts errors were  pos'it'ive
when  using the Ashley, et  al  procedure.
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ztTable  1 -  Nominal  GNP  Growth  and  Adjusted
Monetary  Base  Growth
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t6Table  2 - Noninal  GNP  Growth  and  the 5t.  Louis
Adjusted  Monetary  Base  Growth
(Sample  period:  I/1959  -  IVl1979)
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29Table 3 -  Nominal  GNP  Growth  and  the Board
Monetary  Base  Growth
(Sample  period:  I/1959  - Iv/1979)
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Table  4 - Nominal  GNP  Growth  and  the Board
Adjusted  Monetary  Base  Growth
(Sample  period:  I/1959  -  lU/1979)
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31Table  5  -  Noninal  GNP  Gro\,tth Equation  with  St.  Louis
Adjusted  llonetary  Base Gronth  and  Deviations  (DEV =  SA]18  -  BAI'{B  )
(sanpl-e  period:  r/1959 -  rv/r979)
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FTable 7 -  Root  Mean  Square  Errors for  One-Step
Ahead  Forecasts,  1980-I-l985IV
l4onetary  Base  Root  Mean
Measure  Square  Error
1980I  -  1987rV:
St. Louis  0.01434
Board  0.01436
1980I  -  L982rV:
St. Louis  0.01598
Board  0.01699
1980I  -  1983rV:
St. Louis  0.01572
Board  0.01560
1984I  -  1987IV:
St. Louis  0.01946
Board  0.01696
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